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NOTES
Fugitives and Forfeiture -
Flouting the System or
Fundamental Right?
INTRODUCTION
Is a fugitive claimant in a civil forfeiture action defending his due
process rights or "flouting the system"?' Until recently, the answer was
clear. However, the recent decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, United States v. $40,877.59,2 creates a split in authority
regarding the right of one who is a "fugitive from justice" to defend
seized property.3 The Seventh Circuit is the first court to take the
approach that defending property in such an action is based on the
fundamental due process right to a fair hearing;4 other courts consider a
fugitive to be "flouting!' the system by defending in this manner.5 The
' This phrase has been used to define the situation where a defendant could "accept
the benefits from a favorable adjudication ... but could choose to avoid the consequences
of an adverse adjudication." United States v. $40,877.59, 32 F.3d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir.
1994) (citing Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876)).
Z Id.
3 For a discussion of the varying definitions of "fugitive from justice," see infra
notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
4 $40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1153. The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in relevant part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V. Several Supreme
Court cases have noted that this provision includes the right to a hearing in order to
answer charges and present evidence and defenses. See, e.g., Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S.
409, 413-14 (1897) (finding that strildng out an answer and rendering a decree pro
confesso as punishment for contempt constituted a denial of due process).
' The Supreme Court in Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1206
(1993), explained the fugitive disentitlement doctrine as follows: "The fugitive from
justice has demonstrated such disrespect for the legal processes that he has no right to call
upon the court to adjudicate his claim." See also United States v. Timbers Preserve, 999
F.2d 452, 453 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding an entry of default in a forfeiture proceeding
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Seventh Circuit's approach is more in touch with the Supreme Court's
changing attitude towards forfeiture. Recent cases suggest that the Court
endeavors to make forfeiture a fairer and more limited doctrine than in
the past.'
Part I of this Note examines the origins of civil forfeiture and its uses
from the Middle Ages to the 1970s to more recent times.7 Part II gives
an historical perspective on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, including
its use to deny standing in a civil forfeiture action.' Part III describes the
Seventh Circuit's holding and rationale in $40,877.59.' Part IV analyzes
the holding and rationale of $40,877.59." The Note concludes that the
Seventh Circuit's holding is consistent with due process and that a
person's fugitive status should not be a bar to defending property seized
by the government." At a minimum, a bipartisan hearing should be held
for all claimants, regardless of status, to ensure the fairness of the seizure
and the action as a whole.
I. CiviL FORFEITURE
A. Historical Background
Civil forfeiture is an action by the government against property
suspected of being used in or purchased with the profits from certain
illegal transactions. The action is in rem, which means that the
property itself, not the owner, is the defendant. The property in this
context is considered, by its very nature, to be a "wrongdoer."' 3 In order
to prevent the government from keeping the seized property, all persons
under the fugitive disentitlement theory); United States v. $129,374, 769 F.2d 583, 586-87
(9th Cir. 1985) (using disentitlement doctrine to bar conservator's intervention in forfeiture
proceeding), cert. denied sub nom. Geiger v. United States, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986);
Conforte v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a taxpayer
who was a fugitive from justice was not entitled to prosecute an appeal).
6 See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 12-37 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 38-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 76-115 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 116-51 and accompanying text.
" See pp. 650-51.
l Congress determines the scope of the action. See infra notes 19-22 and
accompanying text.
"3 See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971)
(noting that in forfeiture proceedings, inanimate objects themselves are considered guilty
of wrongdoing); Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture
Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 927 (1991).
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with a claim to it must appear at a hearing and prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the property was not used in or purchased with the
proceeds of the crime in question.'4
Civil forfeiture has existed in some form since the Middle Ages,
when any property causing the death of a person was forfeited to the
English Crown." Forfeitures were later used in America to enforce
violations of maritime or admiralty law." The colonies used similar
concepts to rationalize the seizure of hostile ships and other vessels in
wartime. 7 The United States government also used this concept to
justify confiscation of Confederate property at the end of the Civil
War." Civil forfeiture today is used to enforce customs duties and other
administrative regulations.19
However, the effect of civil forfeiture was not realized fully until
Congress established both civil and criminal forfeiture as tools in the war
on drugs and crime in the early 1970s." Forfeiture also has been
approved for use in money laundering and financial institution fraud,2'
and it is now a penalty for violations of several crimes and regulations.'
14 E.g., United States v. $40,877.59, 32 F.3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir. 1994); Arthur W.
Leach & John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to the Civil
Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 241, 254-55 (1994). Compare the civil
forfeiture proceeding with the criminal forfeiture proceeding. See infra note 26.
15 This doctrine was known as "deodand." See Piety, supra note 13, at 928-29; Leach
& Malcolm, supra note 14, at 247. Piety notes that, in many cases, only the value of the
offending objects was forfeited. Piety, supra note 13, at 928-29. See generally id.; Leach
& Malcolm, supra note 14 (providing an excellent history of civil forfeiture and its uses).
16 Piety, supra note 13, at 935; Leach & Malcolm, supra note 14, at 248.
17 Leach & Malcolm, supra note 14, at 248.
's Id. at 249.
'9 E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (customs regulation); 26 U.S.C.
§ 7325 (1988) (administrative forfeiture under the Internal Revenue Code).
See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (Controlled Substances)
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1242, 1276 (1970) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see also Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens
of Proof and the War on Drugs, 83 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 274, 275 & ni.6-18
(1992) (discussing how forfeiture proceeds are used to pay more police and prosecutors).
2' See 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Criminal forfeiture, see infra note
26, has been established mainly to deter organized criminal activity. See, e.g., Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992); Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (1988).
' E.g., Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 793(h), 794(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Child Protection Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2253-2254, 1.3(b)(1) progressive order (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (amended by civil and
criminal forfeiture provisions by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 7522(c), 102 Stat. 4181, 4494-4501 (1988)); Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.
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B. Recent Cases Limiting Civil Forfeiture
Almost from the beginning, scholars labeled civil forfeiture actions
as unfair, prejudicial, and even unconstitutional' Unlike traditional civil
suits where the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, in civil forfeiture
actions the claimant to the defendant property must prove that the
property was not used or gained illegally2 Courts have repeatedly
rejected the argument that this approach amounts to a presumption of
"guilty until proven innocent" because the action is not "criminal"
enough in nature to trigger the Due Process Clause prohibition on this
kind of burden-shifting.'
Further, unlike the situation of criminal forfeiture where a conviction
gives rise to the forfeiture,26 in a civil forfeiture action the government
only has to show a "substantial connection" of the property to a suspected
crime in order to seize it.27 This low standard of proof has been criti-
cized for its effect on innocent owners of the seized property, who either
have a joint interest in the property with the suspected criminal or receive
the property without knowledge of its tainted character. 8 Courts have
acknowledged the chance for governmental abuse in the amount or type
of property seized, the limited amount of evidence establishing that a
crime has been committed, and the effect on innocent owners," but they
have generally sustained the doctrine by relying on the duty and necessity
for authorities to prevent and punish crime."
§ 85 3(p) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 31
U.S.C. § 5311 (1970).
See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 14, at 253-56.
24 E.g., United States v. $40,877.59, 32 F.3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir. 1994).
2' See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 14, at 256 (citing United States v. $2,500, 689
F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 1099 (1984)). But see Piety, supra note
13, at 920-21 (noting that civil forfeiture under tariff laws fell under Fourth Amendment
because "the information, though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect
a criminal one" (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886))).
26 See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 14, at 264-65. The criminal forfeiture is an in
personam action, which focuses on the person convicted of the crime. All assets used in
the commission of the crime and/or all profits from the crime must affinatively be
connected with the crime beyond a reasonable doubt in order to be forfeited. Id.
"' E.g., United States v. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that
the "substantial connection' test is the appropriate standard), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056(1986).( 8 See $40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1155; Leach & Malcolm, supra note 14, at 255-57.
2' See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 14, at 254-60.
30 See Piety, supra note 13, at 946-47 (noting where the courts have justified the use
of forfeiture as "remedial").
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In the past five or six years, however, the Supreme Court and some
circuit courts of appeal have begun limiting the application of civil
forfeiture. The Court in Alexander v. United States 1 and Austin v.
United States32 stressed that the amount of the forfeiture should be
proportional to the crime in question. Considering criminal and civil
forfeiture to be "punishment," the Court noted that the forfeited amounts
are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment."
In addition, the Court rejected application of the "relation back'
doctrine to the ownership of the seized property. After 92 Buena Vista
Avenue, the title to the seized property does not vest in the government
until it has been adjudicated as seizeable by a court; thus, the defense of
innocent ownership is available to all making a claim.35 The Court also
has mandated that the requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments relating to notice of the seizure and a proper hearing of any
defenses be met in forfeiture actions.36 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit
31 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2776 (1993) (involving criminal forfeiture). For a brief discussion
of the procedure for a criminal forfeiture action, see supra note 26.
32 113 S. CL 2801, 2812 (1993) (involving civil forfeiture). Decided on the same day,
Austin and Alexander each discussed the need for proportionality under the Eighth
Amendment.
31 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812; Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2776. The Eighth Amendment
provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Court specifically noted in Austin
that a forfeiture such as the one in question was at least partially punitive in nature and
therefore should be considered a "fine." Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808-09.
The Court in Austin, however, refused to set a standard by which lower courts could
establish what was excessive. Id. at 2812. The failure to do so has created a wide variety
of subsequent decisions on the matter. See United States v. 835 Seventh St., 832 F. Supp.
43, 48 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the Austin Court left the matter of fashioning an
appropriate standard to the district courts); Ellen S. Zimiles et al., Proportionality in
Forfeiture Cases in Light of Austin and Alexander, in WHITE COLLAR CPME 1994, at G-
51-52.
3' Prior to United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1135-37 (1993),
the "relation bacl' doctrine was the seemingly accepted idea that
the government's right to forfeited property ... vested at the time of its illegal
use, rather than at the time a forfeiture judgment was obtained or when the
property was seized.... From this, it had been argued that the government had
superior title to anyone acquiring an interest in the property after the illegal act.
Leach & Malcoln, supra note 14, at 262 (footnote omitted).
31 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1137. "The Government cannot profit from the
common-law doctrine of relation back until it has obtained a judgment of forfeiture. And
it cannot profit from the statutory version of that doctrine ... until respondent has had
the chance to invoke and offer evidence to support the innocent owner defense." Id.
36 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 500-02 (1993).
"The ex parte preseizure proceeding affords little or no protection to the innocent
1994-95]
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has held that the government's initiation of both criminal and civil forfeiture
actions resulting from the same crime amounts to double jeopardy in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. These recent cases indicate that the
courts are backing away from their previous dispositions which concen-
trated on the importance of the "remedial" measures in stopping crime
and which sought to conform this interest to the constitutional rights
afforded to all citizens.
II. FUGITIVE DISENTITLEMENT
A. Historical Background
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine as used in civil forfeiture cases
actually is based on the constitutional right to appeal. The Supreme Court
held in early cases that a convicted criminal who flees captivity is a
"fugitive from justice" and thus has no right or standing to pursue an
appeal of that conviction.' Originally, the Court rejected such appeals
due to the fact that the proceedings would have no valid effect on
fugitives.39 However, the Court in Molinaro v. New Jersey determined
that the fugitive waived his rights under the justice system and thus was
"disentitled" from his normal rights." Allowing a fugitive to appeal in
these situations, courts reasoned, would be "flouting" the justice
system.41
owner. ... The Government is not required to offer any evidence on the question of
innocent ownership or other potential defenses a claimant might have." Id. at 502.
The Court established a three-part balancing test to determine if "exigent circum-
stances" exist to seize the property without notice or hearing. That test balances "the
private interest affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that
interest through the procedures used, as well as the probable value of additional
safeguards; and the Government's interest, including the administrative burden that
additional procedural requirements would impose.' Id. at 501.
" United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1994). It must be
noted that this particular decision has created a flurry of discussion concerning the future
of forfeiture among criminal law academicians and enforcers alike. Interview with Sarah
Welling, Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, in Lexington, Ky.
(Nov. 18, 1994).
3 Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692, 692 (1887); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S.
97, 97-98 (1876).
"' See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1203-04 (1993) (regarding
the post-conviction flight and subsequent pre-appeal recapture of defendant).
4o 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (upholding the dismissal of an appeal brought by a
defendant who failed to surrender himself).
41 E.g., Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1206; United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134,
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Over the years, "fugitive disentitlement' spread beyond its original
meaning. In addition to referring to an escapee from conviction, the term
"fugitive" has been defined as one who has not been convicted or even
arrested but who leaves the jurisdiction for the purpose of avoiding
arrest, prosecution, or extradition to answer for the alleged crime.42
Courts have also held fugitive status to be a "state of mind."43 The
person does not even have to possess physical control over the failure to
return to the jurisdiction; if he eaves voluntarily, he is considered a
fugitive."
Courts have applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to bar actions
in other types of situations as well. For example, the appellant does not
have to be a fugitive from the particular sovereign hearing the appeal;
fleeing from any sovereign bars the right to appeal.45 The doctrine also
spread to bar a criminal fugitive from bringing a related civil action"
137-38 (2d Cir. 1988) (declining to reach the merits of an appeal by a defendant who fled
overseas after conviction and remained at large for seven years).
42 See United States v. Timbers Preserve, 999 F.2d 452, 454-55 (10th Cir. 1993)
(involving an individual who had been imprisoned while in Laos); United States v.
Marshall, 856 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1988) (involving a defendant who had left the
state); United States v. $45,940, 739 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir. 1984) (involving involuntary
deportation). This intent to evade justice, in most cases, must be proven by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, see Marshall, 856 F.2d at 900, although some courts do not require
proof of intent, see McGowen v. United States, 105 F.2d 791, 792 (D.C. Cir.) (explaining
that a fugitive from justice is one who simply has left the jurisdiction), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 552 (1939).
" United States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir.) (involving an individual who
had been imprisoned in France), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); see United States v.
Eng, 951 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Fleeing from justice does not... mean a person
[is] 'on the run.' One may flee though confined in prison in another jurisdiction. Fleeing
from justice is not always a physical act.").
"Courts have held voluntary absence from the jurisdiction in which an action is
proceeding to be sufficient to establish fugitive status. Catino, 735 F.2d at 722; see
Yimbers Preserve, 999 F.2d at 454 (noting that the defendant was imprisoned in Laos
when the forfeiture action was commenced); Eng, 951 F.2d at 465 (finding that the
overseas defendant had not done "all within his power" to return to country).
4' E.g., Broadway v. City of Montgomery, 530 F.2d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1976)
(finding that a defendant who was a fugitive from justice was banred from calling upon
the resources of an appellate court for a determination of his case).
" See Schuster v. United States, 765 F.2d 1047, 1049-50 (11th Cir. 1985) (involving
a civil tax suit related to criminal money laundering suspicion); Doyle v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 668 F.2d 1365, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (claiming that
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976), request had not been fulfilled),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1002 (1982); see also Conforte v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 587,
589-91 (9th Cir. 1982) (denying standing in a civil appeal regarding penalties imposed
to a fugitive from criminal tax evasion claims).
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and even later to apply in an in rem civil proceeding.47 Some courts also
hold that, regardless of who initiated the proceedings in civil court, the
person's fugitive status bars his or her participation in that action.4
B. As Traditionally Applied in Civil Forfeiture
The Sixth Circuit first addressed the issue of a fugitive in a civil
forfeiture action in United States v. $83,320.49 That court refused to
extend to the civil forfeiture context5" the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Molinaro v. New Jersey, which held that an appeal could not be made of
a criminal conviction when the defendant had fled custody."1 The court
reasoned that "the individual accused of the related criminal violation is
not necessarily the only individual with a direct, litigable interest in the
outcome of the forfeiture action."'52 The court continued that the "escape
of the criminal defendant should not be raised as a bar to those who may
have a legitimate, innocent interest in exonerating the defendant property
from its wrongdoing," such as creditors and employees of the business
involved in the narcotics scheme in question."
However, later courts distinguished $83,320 and found Molinaro and
other fugitive cases sufficient to bar claims in forfeiture actions. The
court in United States v. $45,940, for example, relied on the fact that the
only person in that case with a claim to the property in question was the
fugitive.' Thus, the court reasoned, the basis for allowing the appeal in
$83,320 (the existence of potentially innocent claimants) was not present,
and the denial of access to a civil forfeiture suit was consistent with other
cases which denied access to civil suits based on fugitive status.'
' See infra notes 49-75 and accompanying text (regarding those courts which applied
fugitive disentitlement to civil forfeiture).
Eng, 951 F.2d at 466 (holding that status as a fugitive bars defense); United States
v. 7707 South West 74th Lane, 868 F.2d 1214, 1216-17 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
fugitive from justice waives due process rights in a civil forfeiture proceeding).
49 682 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that claimant's fugitive status did not
preclude his appeal from the decision ordering forfeiture).
'0 Id. at 576.
396 U.S. 365 (1970).
$83,320, 682 F.2d at 576.
53 Id.
739 F.2d 792, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1984).
"Id. (citing Doyle v. United States Dep'tof Justice, 668 F.2d 1365, 1365-66 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (noting that a defendant who evades federal authority is precluded
from demanding that a federal court address his complaint), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1002
(1982), and Broadway v. City of Montgomery, 530 F.2d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding
that fugitive status bars a defendant from seeking appellate review)).
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The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. $129,374, also rejected the Sixth
Circuit's concerns of third-party claims, stating that "[i]nnocent creditors and
beneficiaries, if any, would benefit only secondarily" to the fugitive, so his
right was foremost in question.' The court reemphasized the expansion of
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to include completely unrelated civil
actions.
57
The First Circuit declined to apply the disentitlement doctrine to fugitive
status in United States v. Pole No. 3172.58 That court ruled that the fugitivet
status was not "closely related" to the civil forfeiture in question 9 More
importantly, the court said that the claimant in Pole No. 3172 did not "invoke
the processes of the court," as he was merely protesting a government
action."0 The court continued: "One of the main considerations in the
fugitive from justice cases is the fact that the fugitive is iying.. .to reap the
benefit of the judicial process without subjecting himself to an adverse
determination."" The court found the fact that the claimant was merely
responding to the government's action to be sufficiently distinguishable.'2
The next year, the Eleventh Circuit took the opposite stance in United
States v. 7707 South West 74th Lane.'3 The court stated that the justification
in $83,320 did not apply, as no claims were made against the property except
by the fugitive." The court then held that the in rem nature of the forfeiture
action did not differ from other civil suits applying disentitlement.6
Following Molinaro, the court opined, "By his own actions as a fugitive...
the appellant has disentitled himself from raising objections ..... " to the
validity of the seizure. The court referred to it as "essentially an uncontested
action."'
The court in United States v. Eng likewise distinguished $83,320 on lack
of a third-party claim." The Second Circuit also explained that it makes no
- 769 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Geiger v. United States,
474 U.S. 1086 (1986). In addition, the existence of such parties was only speculative. Id.
" Id. at 586.
5, 852 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1988).
"Id. at 643-44.
60 Id. at 643.
61 Id.
M'Id.
868 F.2d 1214, 1217 (llth Cir. 1989).
'Id.
"Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1217.
'7Id. (citing United States v. $3,817.49, 826 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1987), and United
States v. Beechcraft Queen Airplane, 789 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1986)).
',951 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1991).
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difference who initiates the proceedings in question; fugitive status is a
bar to defending.' "The doctrine operates as a waiver ... of [the
fugitive's] due process rights in related civil forfeiture proceedings." '7
The court read the previous holding of Pole No. 3172 very narrowly,
finding that it only stood for the proposition that fugitive status without
substantial relation to the forfeiture action does not justify application of
fugitive disentitlement.7"
Finally, in United States v. Timbers Preserve,72 the Tenth Circuit
became the fifth court to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to
civil forfeiture. Finding that the claimant had voluntarily avoided
prosecution and that the seized property was directly related to the crime,
the court affirmed the denial of the claim to the seized property and
entered a default judgment."
Against this background, the Seventh Circuit heard the case of United
States v. $40,877.59.'4 Note that the courts rely heavily on each other's
decisions in applying the disentitlement doctrine. After the first two
courts applied the Molinaro standard, the others simply followed suit,
without regard for constitutional issues such as whether due process
requires a bipartisan hearing."
0 Id. at 466.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 466-67. The court noted that in 7707 South West 74th Lane the defendant
was considered a fugitive because proper notice of the pending action was given to him;
thus, his failure to appear at that hearing gave him the status of "fugitive." Id. at 466.
Additionally, the Eng court clarified the gray edges around the rights of a fugitive
by holding that "[a]ppellant is entitled to all of his due process rights once he returns to
stand trial. None of his constitutional rights are given up by waiving extradition. His
remedy as a fugitive is to forego that status and promptly avail himself of his right to a
speedy and public trial .... Id. at 467.
72 999 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1993).
73 Id. at 454.
74 32 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1994).
'5 Oddly, the courts have merely followed precedent without discussion of the
constitutional consequences.
The court in United States v. $45,940, 739 F.2d 792, 797 (2d Cir. 1984), noted that
other circuits had extended the Molinaro decision to civil cases, citing Conforte v.
Commissioner, 692 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a taxpayer who was a fugitive
from justice was not entitled to prosecute appeal), Doyle v. United States Department of
Justice, 668 F.2d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (finding that the evasion of federal
authority bars a defendant from demanding that a federal court hear his complaint), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1002 (1982), and Broadway v. City of Montgomery, 530 F.2d 657 (5th
Cir. 1976) (barring a fugitive from calling upon the resources of an appellate court for a
determination of his case). The Second Circuit adopted Molinaro without explaining any
of the other courts' decisions to extend it to civil cases and without any explanation of its
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1I. UNITED STATEs v. $40,87759
A. Facts
Iraqi businessman Anas Malik Dohan and two other individuals were
indicted for "allegedly shipping, or conspiring to ship," technological
equipment to Iraq from the United States in violation of executive orders
issued during the Persian Gulf War.7' One defendant was acquitted,
charges were dropped against another.' Dohan remained in Jordan
throughout the war and did not appear to defend the charge." The
government seized all funds in Dohan's Indiana bank account, alleging
that they had been used in furtherance of the illegal transactions.79
Dohan filed a claim to the funds, but the federal district court in Indiana
rejected this claim on the basis that Dohan's fugitive status disentitled him
from defending against the action."0 The court subsequently entered a
default judgment without a hearing.8'
B. Holding and Rationale
In refusing to permit the application of fugitive disentitlement to civil
forfeiture, the Seventh Circuit based its opinion on the principle that
"notwithstanding an individual's status, where he is vulnerable to being
sued, he has the right to defend himself in the action brought against
him."' The court relied on two older Supreme Court cases involving the
own decision to do so.
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. $129,374, 769 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied sub nom. Geiger v. United States, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986), followed the
Second Circuit's lead by citing all previously mentioned cases and adding a discussion of
the holding in $45,940.
Other courts have applied the same rationale for extending the doctrine: the
precedent of Molinaro and its extension by later cases. See, e.g., Conforte v. Commission-
er, 692 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1982); Doyle v. United States Dep't of Justice, 668 F.2d 1365
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1002 (1982); Broadway v. City of
Montgomery, 530 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1976). Not once is the issue of due process
discussed in the context of fugitives and forfeiture.
'7 United States v. $40,877.59, 32 F.3d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1994). The violation was
brought under 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). $40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1151.
$40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1152.
7 id.
7 Id.
go Id.
"Id.
Id. at 1153 (citing McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. 259, 267 (1870)).
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right to defend in situations in which status to do so was unclear. The
Court in McVeigh v. United States held that an "alien enemy" (a
Confederate office holder) was entitled to defend against a forfeiture
action brought against him in Virginia, despite his lack of "locus
standi."83 The Court said that, although McVeigh had a questionable
right to sue in Virginia, it was uncontroverted that he could be sued in
that state." In allowing McVeigh to defend, the Court held that the right
to defend is fundamental, as "[t]he liability and the right are insepara-
ble."85 Likewise, in Hovey v. Elliott, the Court found it a violation of
due process to punish someone with a default judgment merely because
the defendant was in contempt of court.6 The Court reasoned:
The fundamental conception of a court of justice is condemnation only
after hearing. To say that courts have inherent power to deny all right
to defend an action and to render decrees without any hearing whatsoev-
er is ... to convert the court exercising such an authority into a
instrument of wrong and oppression, and hence to strip it of that
attribute ofjustice upon which the exercise ofjudicial power necessarily
depends."
The Seventh Circuit compared the situations of contempt of court (as
in Hovey) to fugitive status and found them similar. The court noted that
the fugitive civil forfeiture claimant was "in a position similar to a party
in contempt of court" '88 because both contempt of court and fugitive
status may work to bar a potential suit. Therefore, by analogy, the court
suggested that the Hovey rationale would find the denial of the fugitive's
right to defend equally as offensive to due process as the denial of that
right to one in contempt of court.8 Further, the court stated that, since
Hovey found no distinction in contempt of court in criminal and civil
proceedings, the right to answer a seizure of property is analogous to the
right to answer charges as granted by due process in criminal cases."
83 78 U.S. at 267.
U Id.
85 Id.
" 167 U.S. 409, 413-14 (1897).
17 Id. at 413-14. The Court reviewed English common law and chancery decisions
as well as early American decisions which supported the idea that contempt of court is
not a bar to defending a subsequent claim. Id. at 414-44.
United States v. $40,877.59, 32 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1154-55.
90Id.
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The court also cited a recent Supreme Court case, United States v.
Sharpe, which rejected the application of the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine "in those very different circumstances where the government,
and not the fugitive, initiates the action."'" Here, the court noted,
although Dohan was the appellant, he was "clearly in a defensive
position,"'92 and it was the government who had seized his property.
Thus, the court opined, Dohan fell within the Supreme Court's precedent
in Sharpe.93
The court next pointed out some of the imbalance and unfairness in
the civil forfeiture proceeding.' According to the court, the fact that the
government could seize the property in question on a "mere allegation"'
constituted the "real injustice" in forfeiture actions.95 Such an allegation,
the court suggested, is an "insufficient basis on which to justify a forfei-
ture." The court also stated that the government's allegations of a
connection between the property and the suspected crime should be
questioned.97 In addition, the court observed that those courts allowing
fugitive disentitlement in forfeiture cases place heavy reliance on the
relationship of the property to the crime in question." However, the
Seventh Circuit noted that the prime purpose of the forfeiture hearing is
to determine whether a connection exists between the property to be
seized and the suspected crime; hence, the requirement of only an
allegation by the government is subject to abuse and "artful pleading."
Likewise, the court stated that the claimant's "fugitive" status is not
always fully established before the forfeiture action commences, and thus
this area is open to abuse by the government's bare allegation as well."°
Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court observed that, in order to be
a "fugitive," one must "intentionally take a material step towards
91 Id. at 1154 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 681-82 (1985), which
held that since the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari caused respondent's fugitive status,
the status did not result in dismissal of the case). The defendant became a fugitive after
his conviction was reversed by the Fourth Circuit and after the Supreme Court granted
certiorari; the Court decided to review the case "on the merits." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 681-
82 n.2.
'2 $40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1154.
93 Id.
" Id. at 1155.
9s Id.
9 Id.
9 Id.
98 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 1156.
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commission of the crime while in the state and then absent himself from
that state. If the crime is then completed while he is outside the state, he
would become a fugitive. 1.1 Further, to be a fugitive, "a defendant
must flee the state with the intent to avoid prosecution."'" Without
hearing his case, the circuit court said that Dohan's status was uncertain
at best and that the forfeiture action was used solely to "bar Dohan from
asserting a claim to his property."' 3
The recent Supreme Court case of United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property rejected the previously common practice of an ex
parte pre-seizure hearing regarding temporary seizure of the property
pending a full forfeiture hearing.' In that case, the Court held that
such a hearing did nothing to preserve the rights of the unrepresented
party who was in jeopardy of losing his property because the government
was not required to present evidence or possible defenses of innocent
ownership.05 The Seventh Circuit, by analogy, noted that "[i]f a
probable cause warrant, issued ex parte, is not sufficient to temporarily
deprive an owner of the use of his property ... , then clearly it is an
insufficient basis on which to justify a permanent loss by forfeiture.""lss
The court also found support in the recent Supreme Court decision
of United States v. Ortega-Rodriguez."7 There, a convicted fugitive,
sentenced in absentia, appealed his re-sentencing upon recapture and
indictment for contempt of court.10' The Supreme Court held that the
court of appeals could not punish the fugitive for disrespect of the
judicial system by dismissing his case." 9 The Court found that the
fugitive's misconduct (fleeing) had "no connection to the course of
appellate proceedings.' 10  In the Court's opinion, allowing flight to bar
... Id. (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)).
10" Id. (citing United States v. Marshall, 856 F.2d 896, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1988), which
held that fugitive tolling statutes apply when the government shows defendant's intent to
flee justice by a preponderance of evidence).
1 Id. at 1156-57.
'" Id. at 1155 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct.
492, 502 (1993)). In such a hearing, the magistrate must decide if there is probable cause
that a connection between the property and the suspected crime exists. If it exists, a
warrant is issued for the seizure of the property, pending adjudication of its lack of
connection. James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 502.
10" James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 502.
106 $40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1155.
10 Id. at 1156 (citing 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (1993)).
1O8rtega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1202-03.
109 Id. at 1267.
110 Id.,
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appellate proceedings gave the courts too much discretion in sanctioning
minor offenders with dismissal of their cases.'
The Seventh Circuit observed that this rationale extends to civil
forfeiture. "[Tihe claimant's fugitive status does not threaten the integrity
of the forfeiture proceeding," and thus, the forfeiture action should not be
dismissed."2
The court concluded by recognizing the fundamental importance of
due process and the opportunity to be heard in the American justice
system. "The courts have a duty to render just decisions that are in
accordance with the law, and without a fair hearing, that cannot be
done."". The government has a valid right to deter crime, the court
noted, and "when properly enforced," the civil forfeiture system "serves
the public good.""4 But, the court warned of certain limits:
[P]roperty that is not illegally obtained or used should not be forfeited,
and cannot be forfeited under the civil forfeiture act, even if the owner
of that property is a fugitive. If the fugitive cannot prove the innocent
ownership of the property, he will lose that property.. . .The only way
to make a just determination of whether that property is forfeitable is
to afford the claimant an opportunity to be heard." 5
Thus, while forfeiture may be legitimate, courts should not be overzeal-
ous in applying this doctrine.
IV. ANALYsis
The Seventh Circuit's opinion illuminates the issue of a person's right
to defend a civil forfeiture action. The courts which have adopted fugitive
disentitlement of forfeiture claims have done so based on the Second
Circuit's decision to follow the criminal appeal doctrine of Molinaro v.
New Jersey."6 None have taken into account the due process right to
a fair hearing,"7 nor have they even mentioned the long-standing rule
111 Id.
112 $40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1156.
"' Id. at 1157.
114 Id.
115 Id.
"6 396 U.S. 365 (1970). It appears that one court after the other simply jumped on
the bandwagon of United States v. $45,940, 739 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1984) (following
Molinaro), without questioning the decision or looking for problems within it. See supra
notes 49-75 and accompanying text.
"1 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing fair hearing).
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in Hovey v. Elliott 8' that a person's status does not bar him or her from
defending a subsequent action."9
The fact that the Supreme Court has established that status makes no
difference in defending a case is of utmost importance to this issue."
The right of one without normal standing in a civil case to answer a
lawsuit against him is exactly the situation presented in $40,877.59."
The fact that courts have not recognized and addressed the analogy before
now is puzzling. Perhaps the courts' eagerness to use civil forfeiture as
a weapon in the war on crime and drugs explains this situation.'
Placing limitations on this action may create problems for the efficient
pursuit of justice, and thus courts may hesitate to do so.'"
Another reason that the courts' reliance on precedent without
discussion appears suspicious is that the facts in Molinaro and other such
cases are distinguishable from civil forfeiture situations. First in the area
of criminal appeals, the fugitive has akeady been convicted of a crime
and has fled confinement.'24 By contrast, in most civil forfeiture actions
barring the fugitive's right to defend, the "fugitive" has not been
convicted of, nor even arrested for, any crime at all." Furthermore, the
criminal appellant fugitive is trying to take advantage of the system by
appealing his conviction while at the same time resisting punishment for
the conviction under the same case.' In civil forfeiture, the claimant's
fugitive activities often stem from a different action or suspected crime
altogether.' In any event; the forfeiture proceeding itself is not the
167 U.S. 409 (1897).
,1 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing Hovey).
no See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
122 See Piety, supra note 13, at 946-47 ("The most commonly cited rationale [for
upholding civil forfeiture] is that [it] is a 'remedial' measure, and thus subject to less
constitutional scrutiny.").
123 Id.
12 See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 365 (1970) (holding that a convicted
criminal who fled the jurisdiction cannot use the court's resources to decide his claim);
Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (holding that the Supreme Court will not
hear a criminal case unless the defendant is located somewhere where he can be held
accountable for the judgment).
", See, e.g., United States v. $40,877.59, 32 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1994).
.. See, e.g., Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993) (upholding
the dismissal of an appeal by a defendant who refused to surrender); Molinaro, 396 U.S.
at 365; Smith, 94 U.S. at 97.
17 See United States v. Pole No. 3172, 852 F.2d 636, 638 (1st Cir. 1988). In fact, it
is often the case that the owner of the property has no connection at all with the
property's involvement in crime. See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 14, at 257 ("[A]
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same as the one from which the claimant is a fugitive, and thus a court
should not be able to punish someone for "unconnected" disrespect for the
courts.
128
Second, those situations in which the courts have extended fugitive
disentitlement to civil cases are also distinguishable from civil forfeiture -the
primary difference being that the government, not the fugitive, brings the
forfeiture action. 9 Despite the Supreme Court's clear position in United
States v. Sharpe that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine does not apply when
the government brings the action,'30 the Second Circuit in United States v.
Eng held that this distinction was "irrelevant." 3' The court in Eng ruled
this way in the face of contrary precedent without even mentioning Sharpe
in its opinion. Such a position seems to be another product of the previously
mentioned drive to continue the prominence of forfeiture as an effective tool
in crime prevention."
Moreover, the decision in $40,87759 reflects the current trend under
recent Supreme Court cases to make the civil forfeiture proceeding more fair
and equitable as a whole to the claimants of the seized property."' The
Court has narrowed the scope of the government's ownership of the seized
property from the time that the crime was committed via the "relation back'
doctrine,"34 to the time that the property is adjudicated as forfeited after a
proper hearing. 5 The Court, recognizing the validity of a claimant's right
to defend, kept the government from effectively barring such defenses by
disallowing immediate, strict-liability forfeiture.'
defense of owner innocence, as opposed to property innocence, is not deemed to be a
valid defense."). But see United States v. Timbers Preserve, 999 F.2d 452, 453 (10th Cir.
1993) (involving an action which stemmed from the same illegal act from which the
claimant was a fugitive); Conforte v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 587, 588-89 (9th Cir. 1982)
(involving an action which stemmed from the same illegal act from which the claimant
was a fugitive).
2 See $40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1157 (citing Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1207).
' This distinction remains even though the claimant bears a burden of proof much
like that of plaintiff in a civil case. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
130 470 U.S. 675, 681-82 (1985); see supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
'31 951 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a convicted defendant who resists
extradition to the United States is a fugitive and cannot challenge civil forfeiture of his
property).
132 See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 681-82; supra note 30 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
"3 United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1135-37 (1993); see supra
notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
"s 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1135-37.
131 See id. at 1135 ("[T]he Government's [position in favor of relation back] would
effectively eliminate the innocent owner defense in almost every imaginable case in which
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The Court again emphasized the need for allowing the presentation
of defenses through a bipartisan hearing by requiring notice of the seizure
action under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."7 Among other
determinations, the Court noted that "[t]he practice of ex parte seizure
... creates an unacceptable risk of error. Although Congress designed the
drug forfeiture statute to be a powerful instrument ... it did not intend
to deprive innocent owners of their property."'" Finally, the concerns
over the excessiveness of the seizures in relation to the crime commit-
ted139 enforce the idea that the Court intends to take a more equitable
approach to forfeiture.
Perhaps one reason for the Court's growing concern over the fairness
of forfeiture proceedings lies in the fact that, procedurally, the govern-
ment already has a substantial advantage over claimants. 4° The govern-
ment must show merely that the property in question is related to the
suspected crime by a "reasonable connection;"" '4 then for the claimant
to win, he or she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
property is not connected.42 Adding further to the imbalance, courts
applying fugitive disentitlement allow the government to establish that the
claimant is a fugitive without a hearing to prove the necessary absence
and intent to avoid prosecution. 43 Clearly, with the given trend toward
preserving more rights of claimants, providing hearing to all claimants,
regardless of status, is a logical step in the courts' quest to ensure fairness
in civil forfeiture actions.
One may argue that allowing all claimants, including "fugitives," to
have a hearing on the validity of the seizure will encourage potential
defendants to flee. Since they may then make a claim to the seizure
anyway, the argument goes, they have nothing to lose by fleeing. In fact,
proceeds could be forfeited. It seems unlikely that Congress would create a meaningless
defense.").
"" United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 500-02 (1993);
see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
138 James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 501.
13" Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993); Alexander v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2776 (1993); see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying
text.
140 United States v. $40,877.59, 32 F.3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cit. 1994); see Leach &
Malcolm, supra note 14, at 254-55.
141 $40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1156.
14 Id. The Seventh Circuit has also noted that as the purpose of a hearing in forfeiture
is to actually determine the connectedness of the property to the crime, the initial
determination is a fiction. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
143 $40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1156-57; see supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
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one may argue that this approach legitimizes the "flouting" that courts
have tried to avoid.
This argument, however, misses the point of the Seventh Circuit's
holding - fairness to all parties, both claimants and the government.'"
When the bipartisan hearing is held on the validity of the seizure, only
that property which is proved by a preponderance of the evidence to not
have been illegally obtained or used will be omitted from the seizure.
Therefore, the government will get that which it deserves (all property
illegally obtained or used), while the claimants' opportunity to defend
against the possibly unfair seizure will still be preserved.
As to the claim that more suspects will flee due to this approach, it
simply does not follow that guaranteeing a defendant his due process
rights will encourage his flight. As previously noted, the suspected crime
involving the property in question and the crime from which the
defendant is allegedly fleeing are often completely different, 45 and
deprivation of rights for a separate offense has been held to be inval-
id."'46 Further, the fact that the government will receive the property in
forfeiture if the claimant is guilty of the suspected crime may be as much
of a deterrent of crime as imprisonment. 47 "The [Supreme] Court
claims that the purpose of seizing assets is to take the incentive out of
drug dealing by preventing the criminals from enjoying the profits of
their illegal activities.""' The Seventh Circuit's ruling goes much
further to protect the rights of all individuals than it does to increase the
number of potential "fugitives."
A significant purpose of civil forfeiture, deterring crime, is a
completely legitimate pursuit. However, the pursuit of criminals does not
justify infringing upon the rights of the innocent.'49 As the Eleventh
Circuit stated in United States v. $38,000: "[W]e must not forget... that
at the core of [the criminal justice] system lies the Constitution, with its
guarantees of individuals' rights. We cannot permit these rights to become
144 $40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1157.
145 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (noting the situation where a
defendant is in contempt of court for a separate offense).
147 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989) (rejecting
the proposition that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to use proceeds of a
crime to pay for his defense). The deterrence goal is also one of the purposes behind the
forfeiture penalty in drug trafficking and other federal crimes. See Paul Finkleman, The
Second Casualty: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1436-
37 (1993).
148 Finldeman, supra note 147, at 1436-37.
149 See Piety, supra note 13, at 977-78.
1994-95]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
fatalities of the government's war on drugs."'"5 Civil forfeiture, as it has
been applied specifically against a "fugitive," is unfair in that it violates
the fundamental right of due process to a bipartisan hearing. The system
is not being "flouted" in these cases; the government will lose no
property to which it is entitled merely by holding such a hearing before
seizure occurs.' Thus the purpose of due process - to ensure fairness
and completeness to all individuals - will never be fully accomplished if
one is not allowed to contest the validity of a proceeding against his
property because of his status.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's decision in $40,877.59 brings to light the true
question in civil forfeiture actions: Does the right to due process via a
hearing to defend property outweigh the governmental interest of
deterring crime? The court correctly answered the question in the
affirmative. By overlooking the existence of this right, or at least its
application in the fugitive scenario, prior court decisions have allowed the
government to seize unknown amounts of "suspected property" without
contest because of the person's alleged fugitive status.
Previous courts have applied the "fugitive" doctrine blindly to
forfeiture actions, without any consideration for due process. The striking
differences between civil forfeiture actions and other actions where the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine has been applied correctly are enough to
distinguish forfeiture and thus prevent status from being a factor in the
defense of such actions.
The Seventh Circuit pointed out what the other courts have over-
looked - status is not a ban to defending an action. The government has
almost carte blanche in determining who is a fugitive and what property
is "reasonably connected" to the crime. A bipartisan hearing is a
fundamental instrument of due process and should be utilized in all
forums.
In addition, this rationale is consistent with recent Supreme Court
cases limiting the scope of civil forfeiture as well as making more fair the
procedures and seizures of civil forfeiture actions. With the already clear
o 816 F.2d 1538, 1549 (1lth Cir. 1987) (holding that the government must establish
that currency was linked to exchange of controlled substance in order to maintain a
forfeiture action).
"' See United States v. $40,877.59, 32 F.3d 1151, 1157 (7th Cir. 1994) ("If the
fugitive cannot prove the innocent ownership of the property, he will lose that property.
If he can prove innocent ownership, the property should not be forfeited in any event.").
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advantage given the government in these actions, the Seventh Circuit has
now put a check on the validity of the seizure.
The government has a legitimate interest in deterring crime and
preventing profit from crime; however, this interest may still be
completely served without the traditional use of civil forfeiture against
fugitives, as such is an abuse of the system. Due to the split of authority,
the Supreme Court should address this issue and affirm the constitutional
due process right.
N. Brock Collins

